





 EMES International Research Conference on Social Enterprise 
 






The effects of workers’ participation in governance, ownership and profit 
sharing on the economic performance of worker cooperatives.                 
 An empirical analysis of 1200 French SCOP 
 
 
 Fanny Dethier and Jacques Defourny
1
 










                                                 
1
 The authors want to express their deep gratitude to the Confédération Générale des SCOP (Paris) for providing 




A production activity results from the association of both labor and capital. The alliance 
between those two inputs makes a company able to perform its economic activity but unable 
to leave aside neither one nor the other. Therefore, why does the decision-making power of 
most companies end up in the hands of capital owners only?  
Many economists, starting with the utopian socialists of the nineteenth century, have raised 
this question. At that time, the questioning of the association between power and capital 
ownership as well as the willingness to incorporate democratic principles in the business 
world led to the launch of initiatives based on so-called cooperative or self-management 
principles.  
Nowadays, this question becomes more relevant than ever. The supremacy of capital along 
with the shareholder’s search for the maximization of short-term profit are seen by many as 
responsible for the recession that Western economies have just come through. The 
shortcomings of our capitalist model highlighted by the crisis lead us to explore other 
business conceptions such as the cooperative, and in particular the worker cooperative. 
Specifically, we propose to study here the economic relevance of this business model, and in 
particular, the impact of workers’ participation on economic performance. 
From a theoretical and empirical point of view, workers’ participation in governance, 
ownership and profit sharing seems to have ambiguous effects on companies’ efficiency. 
Workers’ participation, regarded sometimes as an incentive to make an extra effort, 
sometimes as an additional cost, has fueled many theoretical and empirical scientific debates, 
especially in the 1970’s and 1980’s marking the end of “The Glorious Thirty”. Today, in a 
Europe struggling to find the growth path, it makes sense to try to update the debate. In this 
perspective, we will conduct our own analysis by studying the case of French Sociétés 
Coopératives et Participatives (SCOP). 
This article begins with an overview of theoretical works about self-managed companies’ 
economic performance. Then, in a second section, we present the model thanks to which we 
will address the issue as well as the database that we use. Our approach is based on the 
estimation of a production function "augmented" by variables apprehending the different 
forms of participation. Our econometric estimations will of course be discussed and we will 
conclude with a summary of our main results. 
1. Economic theory and economic performance of the self-managed firm 
According to economic theory, the various forms of participation in a self-managed firm may 
influence positively or negatively the firm's performance through their actions on the workers’ 
productive capacity, on the intensity of their effort in work and/or on the company’s 
organizational efficiency. In the following three paragraphs, we go back on those three effects 
as highlighted by economic theory. 
1.1. The effects of participation on workers’ productive capacity  
Let us focus first on the impact of workers’ participation on their productive capacity and 
specifically, on the increase of human capital, that is to say, the workers’ skills. Indeed, a 
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participatory system can lower turnover and better preservation of professional experience 
within the company through the following three mechanisms: 
- An easier resolution of conflicts thanks to a democratic framework and a better 
information flow. Such a more pleasant working environment encourages workers to 
stay in the company
2
; 
- A low liquidity of capital shares held by workers in the framework of workers’ 
participation in ownership
3
. Since capital shares are reimbursed at their nominal value, 
workers have little incentive to sell capital shares and to leave the cooperative;  
- An incentive for workers, both psychological and material, to dedicate themselves 
more to the firm
4
. In the first case, a participatory scheme generates a stronger 
identification with the company among workers. In the second case, the promise of 
higher income via profit sharing, the greater job stability or, the prospect of 
remuneration linked to years of service are elements that encourage workers to 
compromise themselves in company’s life. 
Participation may, however, have a negative impact on some workers’ productive capacity, 
namely on managers’ one5; the decrease of authority and of discretionary power of managers 
resulting from a participatory system makes the managerial input less productive. 
1.2. The effects of participation on workers’ effort  
The positive image that workers have of their work place, the evolution of their income related 
to company's performance and the increase of responsibilities are three elements resulting 
from participation that encourage workers to make an extra effort and to care more about the 
quality of their work
6
. The possession of capital shares is also an element that promotes 
labor-force’s motivation because it involves a risk for workers of lower wealth if the company 
does not grow richer
7
.  
However, nuances must be brought concerning this motivation generated by a participatory 
system. Regarding for instance profit sharing, since the company’s profit depends on many 
more factors than only on workers’ effort, without any access to management, labor-force 
may be reluctant to invest too much energy in a situation they sparsely control. Participation 
in management allows them thus to decide on key elements with respect to the performance 
and increases their ascendency on the company's success. The involvement of workers in 
decision-making may therefore be essential to feel the positive effect of profit sharing
8
. 
Workers' trust in management is another element that supports the positive influence of profit 
sharing
9
. Indeed, without any clear and accurate information, employees may feel that 
management manipulates the company’s result to their detriment, especially when the extra 
income related to profit sharing is low. 
                                                 
2
 Freeman (1976) et Hirschman (1970) 
3
 Levin (1984) 
4
 Levin (1982) and Vanek (1970) 
5
 Webb & Webb (1920) 
6 
Jevons (1887) and Mill (1909). 
7 
Perotin &Robinson (2003) 
8
 Perotin & Robinson (2003)  
9
 Fakhfakh & Perotin (2000) 
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Another element that seems to reduce absenteeism, laziness and waste is based on the 
development of a system of horizontal monitoring
10
. In an organization ruled by the principles 
of cooperation, pressures and informal sanctions from above are replaced by social dynamics 
based on positive collusion. The peer pressure pushes workers to improve their productivity. 
In addition, employees have the ability to put pressure on the less productive ones given that 
they hold information that is not accessible for managers
11
. 
Other mechanisms related to workers’ participation also positively influence employees’ 
effort in production. In particular, this is the case of the setting of common objectives which 
fosters cooperation between employees and management
12
. 
Nonetheless, several authors express reserves about this positive effect of participation on 
efforts provided by workers. 
First, given the difficulty to measure precisely individual productivity, workers’ remuneration 
is not directly and proportionally influenced by the energy they display. Everyone therefore 
may tend to take advantage from their colleagues’ effort and to decrease their productivity 
without observing a proportional reduction of their remuneration. This free-rider phenomenon 
implies the need of a team supervisor or a foreman and is therefore opposed to the horizontal 
monitoring theory previously developed
13
. Nevertheless, if we further explore the issue by 
assuming that free-riding is chosen by everybody, workers may finally choose to cooperate 
because this solution offers greater benefits to everyone
14
. Vanek (1970) accentuates this 
assumption because according to him, given the democratic principle set up in a self-managed 
company and the absence of conflict between employer and employees, workers perform their 
work as a unit and not as individuals. Consequently, each one provides the necessary effort to 
improve the business’ performance and to increase earnings of all. 
Second, by mortgaging their authority and discretionary power, the participatory system can 
also encourage the company’s management to provide less effort15. 
1.3. The effects of participation on organizational efficiency  
Cooperation creates an atmosphere that facilitates communication between workers and 
management, allowing the latter to be aware of company’s organizational inefficiencies. 
Indeed, in a classical firm, revealing some problems is not always advised for workers
16
. 
Moreover, participation makes workers more likely to implement decisions from 
management, to welcome technological progress and to venture their own innovative 
proposals in their field
17
. 
However, many authors noted that participation can also have a negative impact on 
company’s organizational efficiency. 
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Regarding participation in governance, workers inexperienced in management supervision or 
control through a General Assembly need training in this area, what may represent a 
significant cost for the firm
18
. 
The formation of collective preferences can also create some difficulties when individuals 
have heterogeneous preferences. According to the “public choice" literature, transaction costs 
related to decision-making increase when preferences within a group are heterogeneous
19
. 
When these decisions are taken by majority vote, they are affected by consistency problems
20
. 
The impact of participation on organizational effectiveness also depends on the size of the 
company, especially the number of workers. For example, a participatory model may be less 
efficient in businesses with few employees if the small size of the firm and/or its youth tempt 
the organization to involve everyone in all decision-making, despite the negative impact that a 
“democratic excess” could have on organizational effectiveness21. 
Participation in governance can also be seen as inappropriate in large companies where the 
hierarchical system seems the most suitable to manage complex information at low cost
22
. 
The communication network required for participation in a large organization generates large 
transaction costs and therefore, an inefficient organizational system
23
. 
1.4. Other effects on economic performance 
Participation in ownership implies that workers invest significantly in the firm and it does not 
allow them to effectively diversify their assets. Indeed, the company is the guarantor of both 
their jobs and a part of their savings. Dealing with this situation, workers are less likely to 
make risky investments. They will rather accept a lower level of risk than shareholders whose 
assets portfolio is diversified. This may result in lower productivity for the self-managed 
enterprise
24
. One solution could be to use external investments, but when they are 
accompanied by a control power, what is often the case, the principle of self-management 
weakens. 
1.5. Synthesis 
All in all, economic theory identifies three channels through which worker participation 
affects company's performance: the workers’ productive capacity, the workers’ effort and the 
company’s organizational effectiveness. Through the reading of the ambiguous theoretical 
predictions, workers’ participation appears to be a complex phenomenon. It causes various 
consequences on workers’ behavior and therefore, the most likely global effect on the firm's 
performance is hard to identify. 
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 Marshall (1919) 
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 Jensen & Meckling (1979) 
20
 Bonin & Putterman (1987) 
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 Defourny (1987) 
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2. Lessons from previous empirical studies 
Debates on the effects of workers’ participation have already inspired various empirical 
attempts to capture the actual effects of such participation the performance of self-managed 
firms. Most of these studies were undertaken in the 1980’s and 1990’s but the last fifteen 
years also witnessed various studies. An updated overview of these empirical works is 
provided by Dethier (2014). 
To sum up, such empirical works can be classified into three major categories. First, the early 
studies were based on simple static comparisons of average data for small samples of self-
managed firms, mostly worker cooperatives on the one hand, and for traditional for-profit 
companies in the same industries. Such studies, mostly focusing on countries like the UK, 
Italy and the US appeared very basic and with major limitations, especially regarding the 
small number of observed cooperatives and the broad definition of their industries. 
A second wave of studies used econometric techniques to estimate the impact of various types 
and various degrees of worker participation on self-managed firms’ performance. Estrin, 
Jones and Svejnar (1987) provided a synthesis of such studies carried out for workers 
cooperatives in Western economies. We will not go into details of these techniques now as 
this paper will use the more appropriate ones, i.e. those based on the estimation of a 
production functions “augmented” with some variables reflecting various modes of actual 
participation. 
A third category of empirical studies relied on dataset including both self-managed and 
capitalist firms in the same industries. Some of them provided interesting results but were 
heavily dependent on the quality and comparability of data from both sides. Various 
econometric techniques were used for such comparisons among which estimation of 
stochastic or deterministic “production frontiers” representing the higher levels of output that 
can be achieved with given quantities of inputs. For each firm, a degree of technical efficiency 
can be computed on the basis of its proximity to the production frontier. Provided data are 
available for both types of firms within narrowly defined industries, such works can prove to 
be quite complementary to econometric studies of the second category. 
It is quite difficult to summarize results of all these empirical works. At this stage, let us note 
that various studies tend to suggest a positive effect of worker participation on productivity. 
However, such an effect seems to vary a lot depending on what kind of worker participation is 
analysed. Moreover, evidence of a lower economic performance of workers’ cooperatives 
does exist as well, especially for undercapitalized coops and in certain industries. 
Generally speaking, studies on French workers’ cooperatives (SCOP) carried out since the 
mid-1980’s benefitted from rather good datasets. Among them, econometric works by 
Defourny, Estrin, Jones (1985), and production frontiers estimated by Defourny (1992) could 
rely on data for a few hundreds of cooperatives. However, these works relied on data 
collected for the 1970’s and early 1980’s and updates would be needed. Moreover the 
quantity and quality of data collected by the Confederation of SCOP have increased 
significantly in the last two decades and allow for more reliable works. Finally, we should 
note that a few scholars like Fakhfakh and Perotin (2000) or Fakhfakh, Perotin and Gago 
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(2012) worked on French SCOP with more recent data but from perspectives which are not in 
the line of the second and third categories described here above.  
3. Modelling workers’ participation in French producer cooperatives 
As just mentioned, several studies regarding the impact of participation on the SCOP’s 
performance have already been conducted but the majority of them predate the 2000s. It is 
thus interesting to update the results of those empirical researches using more modern and 
rigorous techniques, especially regarding data collection. We chose to study SCOP because 
they are grouped into a well structured network which provided access to a truly outstanding 
dataset covering most of member cooperatives. Our study is therefore characterized by the use 
of a large reliable database and by the updating of the methods used previously. 
Data used in our study come from the Confédération Générale des Scop (CG-Scop) which has 
lists of its member cooperatives with various characteristics (year of creation, industry, etc.) 
and from the financial statements of these cooperatives which are a collected by the 
Confederation. Our sample consists of general and financial data collected for all SCOP 
members of the CG-Scop in 2006, 2009 and 2012. The choice of these years allows us to have 
information about these cooperatives before, during and after the economic crisis. From our 
primary dataset, we removed enterprises that were unable to provide financial data given their 
recent creation or imminent bankruptcy or that showed inconsistent data. As a result, we have 
at our disposal data for 1219 SCOP in 2006, 1333 in 2009, 1436 in 2012. To our knowledge, 
such a dataset covering practically all French SCOP is probably the largest empirical basis 
ever used in the economic analysis of workers’ cooperatives in Europe and elsewhere. 
Our research strategy does not involve any comparison with conventional companies owned 
and controlled by shareholders. Instead, given that all SCOP have varying degrees of 
participation, the size of our sample almost covering the entire population allows us to 
observe a large spectrum of participation degrees in governance, ownership and profit 
sharing. We will therefore try to see whether the degree of participation along these three 
modes has an impact on cooperatives’ economic performance. The following sections outline 
our methodological approach, results and their analysis. 
3.1.  Methodology: toward an « augmented » production function 
To measure the impact of workers’ participation on company’s economic performance, we 
adopt a method already used by previous similar studies
25
, namely the estimation of a 
production function "augmented" by variables that capture the degrees of the different types 
of participation. Specifically, we consider the following production function: 
𝑉 = 𝑉(𝐾, 𝐿, 𝑋1, ),       (1) 
where 𝑉 stands for the added value; 𝐾, the equity; 𝐿, the average workforce, i.e. the firm’s 
average number of employees during a year; 𝑋1, a vector of variables specific to the company 
including binary variables for the field of activity (industry), the region where it operates, its 
legal form, the way the cooperative was founded, the age of the enterprise; 𝑍, a vector of four 
                                                 
25 
See, among others, Conte & Svejnar (1988), Conte & Tannenbaum (1978), Estrin, Jones & Svejnar (1987), 
Defourny, Estrin & Jones (1985), Jones & Kato (1995) and Jones & Svejnar (1985). 
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variables measuring the importance of the different modes of participation. (See Appendix 1 
for details about these variables).  
A key step in the specification of the model of course consists in determining and in defining 
precisely the variables that constitute the Z vector, namely the four variables measuring the 
importance of the different forms of participation which are the participation in governance, 
the participation in individual ownership, the participation in collective ownership and the 
participation in profit sharing. This will be discussed in the three sub-sections hereafter. 
Another key step of our methodology consists in choosing the most suitable form of equation 
(1), that is to say a form of production function that is relatively simple, whose properties are 
well known, but which however avoids problems of model specification. To meet this 
objective, we have decided to choose between the three following forms of production 
function: a Cobb-Douglas production function (CD), the linear approximation of Kmenta 
(1967) of the production function with constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and the 
transcendental logarithmic form of the production function (Translog). The development of 
these three production functions is available in the Appendix 2. After estimating by ordinary 
least squares these different forms of production function, we will select the best suited to the 
technological state of the economy and analyzes the results. 
3.2. Participation in governance –(LS) 
Measuring participation in governance represents usually a major problem, since this form of 
participation is more qualitative than quantitative. It would have been optimal to conduct a 
detailed survey in all worker cooperatives to assess workers’ actual degree of participation in 
governance. We do not have such data which would have required another whole research 
project. Therefore, we adopt the most frequently used method which consists in taking the 
proportion of workers who are members of the general assembly as a proxy. This variable is 
called LS in our analysis and it varies from zero to one: it is equal to the number of member-
workers divided by the total number of workers (see Table 1 hereafter) 
Although this procedure has been used in various studies, we admit straight away that it is 
unsatisfactory because it only poorly reflects the reality of a participatory governance process: 
it captures only one dimension of such governance, i.e. the right to take part in the G.A., 
which probably hides a diversity of behaviors, from just attending (or not) meetings to very 
active ways of participating in the decision making process within such an assembly.  
3.3. Participation in ownership 
Participation in the ownership of a worker cooperative may take individual and collective 
forms. We will thus establish two different measures in order to assess the impact of these two 
types of participation on the firm’s performance. 
Participation in individual ownership – KLS 
To measure individual participation in ownership, we take the average amount of capital 
shares held by member-workers, as Jones & Svejnar (1985), Defourny (1987) and Jones 
(2007) did. This variable is named KLS and is expressed in euro. It is thus equal to the total 




Let us also note that SCOPs have mechanisms that encourage workers to invest in their 
cooperative without however purchasing capital shares in the short run. More precisely, when 
profits are distributed to workers (see section 3.4. here after), the latter have some fiscal 
incentives to leave such distributed profits on internal accounts which then represent a kind of 
loan to their enterprise. Part of such “loans” can be transformed in capital shares after a 
certain period. However, we were not able to take this “financial individual commitment” of 
workers into account here, especially when it does not induce purchase of shares. 
Participation in collective ownership – COKLS 
In order to take into account the participation in ownership at the collective level, we have 
created a variable named COKLS, expressed in euro. At the end of each fiscal year, all 
SCOPs are under the legal obligation to allocate a share of their net surplus to the 
development fund on one side, to the legal reserve on the other side. The amount of these two 
allocations results from a choice of the GA, even if minimum levels are imposed by legal 
rules and somehow guided by tax benefits
26
. As a consequence, the amount of such 
allocations indicates the extent to which member-workers decide to strengthen the financial 
health of their cooperative rather than to benefit individually from a higher pay. 
Our variable COKLS represents the average amount of profits allocated to both collective 
reserves, namely the legal reserve and the development fund, per member-worker, using in 
this way a method similar to Jones & Svejnar (1985), Jones (2007) and Defourny, Estrin & 
Jones (1985). 

























Amount allocated to collective reserves
Number of member-workers
 Euro 
Profit sharing PARTL 




3.4. Profit sharing – PARTL 
SCOPs are legally obliged to distribute at least 25% of their net income to workers, be they 
members or not. This profit share distributed to all workers is called "worker distribution". In 
                                                 
26
 The amounts allocated to the legal reserve and development fund may be deducted from the taxable basis 
provided that the cooperative commits to reinvest this money in a four-year period. 
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a SCOP, each worker has therefore the right to receive part of profits. When he/she is also a 
member worker, he/she can also receive a dividend for being a “shareholder” of the 
cooperative. However, such a dividend depends more heavily from the financial health of the 
enterprise as the G.A. may decide not to distribute any dividend in difficult years. 
To effectively measure profit sharing, it seems straightforward to take the average amount 
allocated to "worker distribution" per worker. In our analysis, this variable is called PARTL 
and is expressed in euro. Let us note that PARTL does not include any dividends on capital 
shares. 
As already mentioned, workers may decide to leave their profit share on internal accounts 
within the cooperative. If the "worker distribution" is then blocked for a period of five years 
in the firm and then converted into capital shares, they can benefit from tax deductions.  
4. Results of the econometric estimations  
This section outlines the major findings of our empirical research. We will first adopt a 
general point of view without making any distinctions among SCOP on the basis of their size. 
Then we willprovide more detailed results, especially when taking into account size 
categories among cooperatives, a dimension which may influence the actual feasibility of at 
least some forms of participation.   
From a technical point of view, we have decided to only focus on results showing estimators 
which prove to be significant for at least two years out of three. For each model, we have also 
checked the exogeneity of our participatory variables. Indeed, strictly speaking, our 
econometric estimations identify correlations but not the direction of the link between 
independent and dependent variables. In a series of previous studies, authors acknowledged 
they just assume exogeneity. In our case, we have tried to check whether participatory 
variables were indeed exogenous instead of endogenous. The possible endogeneity of the 
participatory variables would mean that the level of participation is itself determined by the 
cooperative's economic performance. We therefore have tested the nullity of correlations 
between the error terms of our models and the participatory variables as potential sources of 
endogeneity. The absence of correlations demonstrated by our testing tends to suggest that our 
participatory variables are not sources of endogeneity and that our model does not face any 
simultaneity problem. Our participatory variables thus do not appear to depend on our 
dependent variable measuring the enterprise’s performance and thus suggest a certain 
robustness of our results. 
4.1. Impact of workers’ participation without size categories 
As announced, we start by adopting a general point of view, i.e. without adding any dummy 
for size categories to variables included in the “augmented” production function. Table 2 
hereafter shows in a simplified way results for estimated coefficients of the participatory 
variables. Full results are presented in Appendix 3.  
Impact of participation in governance - LS  
Let us start with the analysis of the impact of the participation in governance through the LS 
estimated coefficients. Our results mainly show a negative and significant effect of the 
workers’ participation in governance on cooperatives’ performance. In our theoretical 
11 
 
synthesis, we have pinned that participation in governance could diminish the authority and 
the discretionary power of managers and thus undermine the effectiveness of the managerial 
input
27
. Nevertheless, remember that LS is a less reliable indicator of workers’ participation 
and more comments should come from taking account the size of cooperatives (section 4.2).  
Table 2: Results of econometric estimations for the participatory variables 
 
LS 
_06 - ** 
_09 - ** 
_12 - *** 
KLS 
_06 + ** 
_09 + * 
_12 +  
COKLS 
_06 -  
_09 -  
_12 -  
PARTL 
_06 + *** 
_09 + *** 





*/**/*** indicates a significant test at the threshold of 10/5/1 percent(s) 
-/+ indicates a negative/positive estimator  
Source: data from the CG-Scop 
Impact of the participation in individual ownership - KLS 
Regarding the participation in individual ownership, we observe a positive and moderately 
significant impact of this participation on added value in two years out of three.
28
. In our 
theoretical synthesis, we have noted that the individual participation to capital can improve 
business performance through the increase of human capital as a result of the lower staff 
turnover
29




Second, and more directly, since the prospect of receiving a higher dividend depends on their 
productivity, the more capital shares one member-worker holds, the stronger the incentives 
they have to provide a more intense effort in work
31
.  
Impact of the participation in collective ownership – COKLS 
When it comes to the participation in collective ownership, this link between pay and 
participation appears to be less direct for the worker
32
. Indeed, we observe no significant 
impact
33
 of the participation in collective ownership on performance. 
                                                 
27
 Webb & Webb (1920), Marshall (1919) and, Steinherr (1977). 
28
 Defourny et al. (1985), Estrin et al. (1987), Jones & Svejnar (1985) et au niveau de la rentabilité de 
l’entreprise, Conte & Tannebaum (1978). 
29
 Levin (1984). 
30
 Levin (1982) et Vanek (1970). 
31
 Jones & Kato (1995). 
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Since the allocation of a proportion of profits to collective reserves is legally bound and tax-
efficient, this result is logic: an increased collective ownership only slightly reflects a real will 
of the member-workers to take more part into a collective effort. 
In addition, we explain this result by the fact that the COKLS estimator competes with the 
KLS and PARTL estimators. Indeed, the member-worker remains aware that a greater 
participation in collective ownership contributes to a balanced situation for the company but it 
is only in the long term that they will benefit, for example, from a more stable job or from a 
higher pay
34
. In the short term, however, the allocation of a larger share of profits to collective 
reserves means weaker possibilities for dividends and for remunerating workers in the form of 
"work distribution". Since, in the case of participation in individual ownership and of profit 
sharing, the link between benefits and effort is more direct, it is logic to observe that KLS and 
PARTL have more significant estimated coefficients than COKLS. This leads us to analyze 
the PARTL estimator. 
Impact of profit sharing - PARTL 
In our estimations, the link between profit sharing and cooperatives’ performance clearly 
appears to be positive and significant. Such a result is not surprising as it confirms a trend 
which already appeared in various previous studies, not only about French SCOP but about 
workers’ cooperatives in several other countries as well35. This result can be considered 
logical given that there seems to be a direct link between workers’ higher pay and a more 
intense effort leading to better economic performance. 
4.2. The influence of SCOP size 
Although these first estimations already highlight important elements that explain the impact 
of participation on company’s performance, our analysis should not be stopped now. Indeed, 
several authors among whom Defourny (1987) have suggested that the size of a worker 
cooperative also influences the importance of this impact because the ways workers can 
actually participate and feel the benefits of such participation are extremely different in a 
context where the workforce is made of say 5, 50 or 500 people.  
Correlation between participation and workforce size                                                                 
Such a hypothesized relation between the size of a cooperative and workers’ participation 
appears particularly convincing by looking at Table 3 hereafter which shows correlation 
coefficients between participatory variables and the average (over a year) number of workers 
are strongly significant for three of our four participation indicators. 
From this table, we see that when the size (workforce) of the cooperative increases, the 
proportion of workers who are members decreases. This meets the common sense: in its 
founding stage, a workers’ cooperative generally involves all the latter in its membership. At 
                                                                                                                                                        
32
 This result is similar to the one obtained by Estrin & al. (1987). 
33
 However, let’s note that when we take into account the fact that participation can have an embedded and a 
non-embedded effect into the labor factor, the impact of participation in collective ownership appears slightly 
significant and positive. 
34
 Levin (1982) and Vanek (1970) theoretically had imagined this positive effect of participation in collective 
ownership. 
35
 Defourny & al. (1985), Estrin & al (1987), Fakhfakh & Perotin (2000), FitzRoy & Kraft (1986 ; 1987a ; 
1987b), Jones & Kato (1995) and, Jones & Svejnar (1985) 
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the other extreme, workers being hired by a large cooperative are less likely to all become 
members.  
Table 3:Correlation coefficients between participatory variables and the number of employees 
 L_06 L_09 L_12 
LS -0,10046763*** -0,12827510*** -0,15099520*** 
KLS 0,16966249*** 0,14797584*** 0,13397973*** 
COKLS 0,09896016*** 0,07989917*** 0,06872484*** 
PARTL 0,02447659 0,00732564 -0,00103991 
*/**/*** rejection of the null hypothesis of no correlation at 10/5/1 percent (s) 
Otherwise, non-rejection of the null hypothesis of no correlation 
Source: data from the CG-Scop 
 
As to participation in individual and collective ownership, we note that both of them are quite 
significantly and positively related to the cooperative size, although with the correlation 
coefficient for the former (KLS) being twice as high as for the latter (COKLS), both variables 
being expressed in euro/(member) worker. Several reasons may explain such relationships 
which can probably reflect influences in both directions. First, a greater participation in 
individual ownership (more shares per worker) implies a greater availability of equity funds 
for the enterprise and, all things being equal, a greater capacity for the enterprise to finance its 
growth. In the other direction, we have seen that the net operating surplus allocated as 
"worker distribution" can be blocked for a period of time with tax exemption
36
. In such a 
context, a large company, being more likely to be older and to have experienced more years 
of economic success, has probably distributed more profits as "worker distribution" over time. 
At least part of the latter having been converted into capital shares, accumulated participation 
in individual ownership is generally higher in large companies.  
Regarding the COKLS variable, it seems clear that a higher participation in collective 
ownership (through profits being allocated to a collective reserve) also enables greater 
availability of funds to finance the cooperative’s growth. 
Finally, concerning the PARTL variable, we see no significant correlation between profit 
sharing and company size. Instead of resulting from a cumulative process of purchasing 
shares (KLS) or allocations to collective results, the participation to profit sharing is a yearly 
event which may totally differ from one year to another. Moreover, the annual economic 
success of an enterprise is probably more related to various internal and external factors than 
to the workforce size. 
Results from econometric estimations  
We now use the same approach as in the general case (section 4.1 here above), but separating 
our SCOP population into three different groups, depending on the enterprise’s size. We have 
defined small businesses as those whose average number of employees is less than 10; the 
average number of employees of medium-sized enterprises is between 10 and 49; and the 
                                                 
36
Distributed profits which are blocked for five years on internal individual accounts under "worker distribution" 
are exempt from income tax and social security contributions. In case of immediate payment of "worker 
distribution", the distributed profits are subject to income tax.  
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workforce of large companies is greater than or equal to 50
37
. Estimations we obtained for 
participatory variables are represented in a simplified way in Table 4, full results being 
presented in Appendix 3 (Table A3.b). 
 
Table 4: Results from econometric estimations for the participatory variables with size effects 
 L < 10 10 ≤ L < 50 50 ≤ L 
LS 
_06 -  -  +  
_09 -  +  -  
_12 - *** -  +  
KLS 
_06 +  + ** +  
_09 +  + *** +  
_12 -  + *** +  
COKLS 
_06 + ** +  - ** 
_09 -  +  +  
_12 +  -  +  
PARTL 
_06 + *** + *** + *** 
_09 + *** + *** + ** 
_12 + *** + *** + *** 
R2 
ajusté 
_06 0,795 0,798 0,8491 
_09 0,6865 0,7301 0,9193 
_12 0,7055 0,7897 0,8706 
*/**/*** indicates a significant test at the threshold of 10/5/1 percent(s) 
-/+ indicates a negative/positive estimator  
Source: data from the CG-Scop 
Impact of participation in governance – LS 
We first observe that when we disaggregate the impact of participation by company size, the 
estimator of the participation in governance becomes generally non-significant. This result is 
discordant with the one we previously obtained but this can be at least partly explained along 
the following lines. First, in spite of the already stressed weakness of the proportion of 
workers who are members as an indicator of actual participation in governance, such a ratio 
still deserves some attention. More particularly, the proportion of member workers appeared 
strongly correlated to the cooperative size (Table 3), which helps to understand that such 
correlation most probably decreases among cooperatives within more homogenous size 
categories. Second, coming now to the impact of the proportion of member workers on the 
enterprise’s performance, the strong negative effect suggested by our first results (Table 2) 
may have disappeared with the strong reduction of the size effect within size categories. Even 
if such an interpretation may be correct, we should not forget that our LS variable remains a 
poor indicator of the actual workers’ participation in governance. 
                                                 
37
 For small businesses, the number of SCOP for the years 2006, 2009 and 2012 is respectively 686, 695 and 
817. For the medium-sized category, the number of SCOP for the years 2006, 2009 and 2012 is respectively 444, 
502 and 486. For the large-size category, the number of SCOP for the years 2006, 2009 and 2012 is respectively 
119, 136 and 133. 
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Impact of participation in individual ownership - KLS 
Coming now to individual participation in ownership, Table 4 show much clearer results than 
our previous estimations where the KLS estimator only appeared only slightly or moderately 
significant for two years out of three. On the contrary, the KLS estimator is most often highly 
significant and positive for medium-sized enterprises, while it is never significant (although 
positive) for small-size and large workers’ cooperatives. Such a clear result for a quite precise 
and reliable indicator of participation seems to be a major result of our empirical analysis. 
Moreover, it tends to confirm results achieved by previous studies of French SCOP relying on 
a large number of observations (around 300 or 500 SCOP) which however were much older 
(1970-1979). By that time, such studies were carried out by Defourny et al. (1985) and 
Defourny (1987) with augmented production functions like in this paper, by Defourny (1986) 
for comparative performance analysis on the basis of financial and economic ratios as well as 
by Defourny (1987, 1992) for comparative performance analysis carried out through the 
estimation of stochastic production frontiers. Let us now see what can be drawn from these 
previous studies for the interpretation of our present results. 
Many small workers’ cooperatives seem to suffer from under-capitalization (Defourny, 1986, 
1987). In labor-intensive industries such as intellectual services, the low level of capital 
brought about by workers into a SCOP in its initial stages does not affect much the 
cooperative’s performance. However, in the case of more capital-intensive industries, such 
under-capitalization prevents cooperatives from achieving a good performance, while a 
traditional entrepreneur may have at the outset or find more easily enough capital for the 
enterprise he is setting up (Defourny 1990). By separating our population according to the 
workforce size, we have created a group of small SCOP partly made up of cooperatives 
suffering from underfunding and therefore, the overall category of small SCOP logically 
displays various levels of economic performance. In such a heteroclite group, the link 
between KLS and business’ performance then proves to be difficult to observe. 
To interpret the quite significant results regarding medium-sized SCOP, we put forward the 
hypothesis that the KLS variable, i.e. the average amount (in euro/memeber) of workers’ 
individual capital shares may reflect three drivers of workers’ involvement: 
- Co-ownership: through participation in individual ownership, the worker buys at least 
one share of his enterprise and becomes co-owner. This reinforces the sense of the 
worker’s identification to the company. Moreover, such co-ownership is steadily 
reinforced each time distributed profits are converted into capital shares after having 
been blocked on personal accounts within the cooperative. 
- Co-responsibility: the purchase of capital shares makes the worker co-responsible of 
the company's decisions. Indeed, holding a capital share gives him access to the GA 
which holds the ultimate decision making power, even if the decision-making process 
is organized through delegations to a single director or a board of directors for 
everyday life. 
- Co-benefit: as a shareholder of the cooperative, the worker is also entitled to profit 
sharing in the form of a (limited) dividend for the capital shares he/she holds. 
16 
 
We explain the non-significance of KLS in large enterprises mainly by the fact that the larger 
the company is, the less workers feel influenced by the three previous elements, in spite of the 
fact that the average amount of individual capital shares may be the higher in large SCOP as 
suggested by Table 3 here above. Regarding co-ownership, the feeling of self-identification of 
each worker is probably diluted in a group of more than 50 or 100 member workers. In terms 
of co-responsibility, the same dilution effect occurs: the weight of a worker in the decision-
making process, as well as his/her sense of responsibility is lessened when the size of the 
company increases.  
As to the right to receive a dividend on individual capital shares, it certainly exerts a stronger 
effect in small and medium-sized cooperatives than in larger ones. In a small business, a 
member worker can particularly influence the performance of the latter by being more 
productive and therefore expect to receive a larger dividend. This probably holds true in 
medium-sized cooperatives when this effect is combined with the others already stressed for 
such a category. On the other hand, in large companies, the extra effort provided by a member 
worker is much more diluted and it has a less direct impact on the company’s profits and on a 
potential dividend. 
As a general note about incentives provided by a potential dividend, we know that such a 
dividend always remains limited due to a key cooperative principle imposing a limited 
remuneration of capital. Second, such a dividend can only, by definition, be decided when the 
year’s net income is positive. Third, when making profits, French SCOP seem to prefer 
organizing first individual participation in profits among all workers through the “worker 
distribution” mechanism associated with fiscal incentives, rather than through dividends on 
shares. In conclusion, the individual participation in ownership does not probably reflect 
much of the effects which might result from profit distribution. As we will see, the variable 
PARTL captures such effects much better as already suggested by results presented in Table 
2, even without taking the size of cooperatives into account. 
Impact of profit-sharing – PARTL 
Indeed, results for the PARTL estimators remain all positive and strongly significant with 
disaggregation of our SCOP population into size categories. This is clearly the second major 
finding of our empirical analysis: workers’ participation in profits does exert a strong effect 
on cooperatives’ economic performance whatever the size of the workforce. To rightly 
interpret this result, we can stress that participation in profits, especially through “worker 
distribution” is to a large extent proportional to the overall profits as at least 25% of total 
profits must be distributed to workers. This means here that workers’ increased efforts leading 
to higher profits in general are “paying back” almost automatically whatever the size of the 
cooperative. Along the same lines, as already stressed, distribution of profits is a yearly 
“event” and individual benefit directly depending on the overall efforts provided by workers 
during that year while individual participation in ownership is a cumulative process less 
related to the annual performance.  
Impact of the participation in collective ownership – COKLS 
We left the COKLS estimators for the very end of this analysis as they are weakly significant, 
regardless the cooperative size. It thus seems that participation in collective ownership 
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influences very slightly economic performance. This was already our assessment in the 
previous section because this indicator follows external rules about allocation of profits to a 
collective reserve rather than resulting from an actual expression of participation. 
Conclusions 
Faced with the harmful consequences that the capital and the shareholder hegemony has on 
our economies, a growing number of citizens and institutions do question growing 
unequalities and increasing gaps between capital and labor incomes. Alternative ways of 
producing goods and services are experimented in order to better take into account the 
interests of the enterprise other stakeholders. In this overall search for a greater pluralism of 
economic models, the workers’ cooperative is drawing much more attention than 10 or 20 
years ago. According to a report of the European Commission, it even appears as "one of the 




Through our research, we wanted to better apprehend potential advantages and weaknesses of 
such a “production and management system” and in particular, the effects of workers’ 
participation in governance, ownership and profit-sharing on their cooperative’s economic 
performance. Relying on previous empirical studies and predictions of economic theory, we 
conducted our own analysis with an outstanding dataset provided by the General 
Confederation of SCOP for more than 1,200 worker cooperatives and the years 2006, 2009 
and 2012. 
The estimation of a production function "augmented" by variables apprehending the different 
forms of participation demonstrate unequivocally that profit-sharing in workers’ cooperatives 
of  all sizes and participation in individual ownership in medium sized cooperatives positively 
and significantly influence the enterprise's performance.
39
  
We had data for years before, during and after the last major financial and economic crisis but 
we did not identify any major impact of the latter. A certain number of SCOP probably 
experienced difficulties or even went bankrupt but we can state the effects of participation 
remained throughout the period. Combined with many observations made by a European 
federation of workers’ cooperatives, this might suggest the latter can demonstrate a particular 
“resilience” in difficult times, likely related to a deeper involvement of workers in their 
enterprise’s everyday life. 
Finally, it should be stressed that French SCOP operate in an environment which 
acknowledges specificities of worker cooperatives through an adequate legal status and 
through special tax incentives fostering workers’ participation in ownership and profits. In 
July 2014, some additional policy measures were adopted by the French Parliament to further 
improve some supports to worker cooperatives alongside a better recognition of the “social 
and solidarity economy”, somehow equivalent to a broad “third sector” distinct from the 
private capitalist and public sectors.  
                                                 
38
 Commission Européenne (2013, p .53) 
39
 See Appendix 4 for a brief summary of all  results 
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All this suggest that the comparative better performance of worker cooperatives is more likely 
to appear in an eco-system which allow the latter drawing the best from their very 
characteristics instead of just being constrained by rules and public policies generally 
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Appendix 1: Variables of the “augmented” production functions 
 
This appendix lists the variables used in our analysis of French SCOPs and their definitions. 
Data used for these variables were all provided by the General Confederation of SCOP for 
their members for the years 2006, 2009 and 2012. 
Continuous variables 
The following variables take continuous values: 
- AGE: the age of the SCOP; 
- V: the gross added value of the SCOP, in euro; 
- L: the average number of employees in the SCOP; 
- K: the total equity of the SCOP, i.e. the sum of capital shares, legal and statutory 
reserves, retained earnings (that is to say, the net surplus from previous years retained 
and not allocated to reserves) and the profit for the year, in euro; 
- LS: the proportion of workers who are co-owners/shareholders of the SCOP, in 
percentage; 
- KLS: the average capital shares held by member-workers, in euro; 
- COKLS: the share of net operating surplus allocated to collective reserves, namely the 
legal reserve and the development funds, per member-workers, in euro; 
- PARTL: the share of net operating surplus allocated to workers, members or not, per 
worker, in euro. 
 
Binary variables  
The following binary variables take the value "1" when the cooperative belongs to this 
category, "0" otherwise. 
Founding methods 
There are four methods to found a SCOP: 
- EXNIHILO: the company started under the SCOP form; 
- REANIM: the company was operating under a different legal form from SCOP, 
temporarily ceased its activities and restarted under the SCOP form; 
- TRANSFO: the company was operating under a different legal form from SCOP and 
has been transformed into a SCOP without a cease of its activities; 
- TRANSMI: the company was operating under a different legal form from SCOP and 
has been transformed into a SCOP when the owner passed it down to the workers. 
Regions  
We chose the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS), Level 1, to classify 
SCOP according to their region. According to this nomenclature, France is divided between 
eight spatial planning economic zones and a ninth zone containing the overseas departments. 
Nine binary variables thus reflect these geographical zones. 
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Fields of activity 
We chose to keep the same classification as the one used by the CG-Scop. The latter is based 
on the French Activities Nomenclature (NAF) rev. 2, 2008 and classifies the SCOP in eight 
fields of activity/ industries: 
- AGR: Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
- INDUEX: Extractive industry, energy, water and waste management 
- INDUMA: Manufacturing industry 
- CONSTRU: Construction industry 
- COM: Trade, automobile and motorcycle repairs 
- TRANS: Transportation and storage 
- SERV: Service industry including: Accommodation and restaurant; Information and 
communication; Financial and insurance activities; Real estate activities; Specialized, 
scientific and technical services; Administrative services and support activities, Arts, 
entertainment and recreation activities; Other service activities. 
- EDU: Education, health and social work sector. 
 
Legal forms 
SCOP can choose between the legal form of Limited Liability Company
40
 or Public Limited 
Company
41
 (with a board of directors or with an executive board).  
SARL variable takes the value "1" when the SCOP operates under the legal form of Limited 
Liability Company and "0" when the SCOP works under the legal form Public Limited 
Company. 
  
                                                 
40
 The legal form of Limited Liability Company is called Société à Responsabilité Limitée – SARL in French.
  
41
 The legal form of Public Limited Company is called Société Anonyme – SA in French. 
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Appendix 2: The production functions 
 
If i represents the firm, t the date, x the elements of the vector 𝑋1 and z the elements of the 
vector Z, we estimate thanks to our database the following models: 
CD : 
ln 𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1 ln 𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2 ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛼3𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛼4𝑚
4
𝑚 𝑧𝑚𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 ; (1.1) 
 
CES : 
ln 𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ln 𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽3𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛽4𝑚
4





+  𝜇𝑖𝑡  ;
            (1.2) 
Translog : 
ln 𝑉𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾0 +  𝛾1 ln 𝐾𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾2 ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾3𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑗𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝛾4𝑚
4
𝑚 𝑧𝑚𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5|ln 𝐾𝑖𝑡|
2 +
𝛾6|ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡|
2 + 𝛾7 ln 𝐾𝑖𝑡 ln 𝐿𝑖𝑡 +  𝜇𝑖𝑡 .        (1.3) 
We focused on the vectors 𝛼4, 𝛽4or 𝛾4 that measure, in percentage, the impact on the added 
value of a one-unit change of the individual elements of the vector Z. This linear form allows 




Appendix 3: Estimation results 
In this appendix, we present the estimation results of our models. The first table refers to the 
models estimated for the analysis from a general point of view (without any size effect); the 
second table contains the estimated models for the analysis allowing for a size effect. 
Table A3.a. : Impact of workers’ participation on added value 
Heteroscedasticity corrected 
Student statistic in parentheses 
*/**/*** indicates a significant test 
at the threshold of 10/5/1 
percent(s) 
The variable SA is perfectly 
correlated with the variable SARL; 
the variable TRANSMI is perfectly 
correlated with the variables 
EXNIHILO, REANIM and 
TRANSFO 
Source: data from the CG-Scop


















































































Yes Yes Yes 
n 1219 1333 1436 
R
2
 ajusted 0,935 0,895 0,91 
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Table A3.b: The impact of workers’ participation on added value by categories of SCOP size 
 
2006 2009 2012 
L < 10 10 ≤ L < 50 50 ≤ L L < 10 10 ≤ L < 50 50 ≤ L L < 10 10 ≤ L < 50 50 ≤ L 
const 
12,1111*** 9,99355*** 8,731*** 12,04*** 9,220*** 8,618*** 11,52*** 9,297*** 8,939*** 
(15,6387) (44,2827) (15,98) (0,6406) (0,2452) (0,4475) (21,28) (47,20) (23,07) 
AGE 
-0,0018814* -0,00079 0,002596 0,0001396   0,0001057   0,0007834   0,001211 -0,001940** 0,002293* 
(-1,7886) (-1,1237) (1,537) (0,001700) (0,0009085) (0,001481) (0,7007) (-2,573) (1,819) 
EX NIHILO 
-0,0054859 0,00792169 0,01485 -0,03098   0,02776   0,08891   -0,1714*** 0,02266 0,06545 
(-0,1196) (0,1926) (0,1710) (0,06048) (0,04170) (0,08456) (-3,058) (0,5879) (0,9054) 
REANIM 
-0,0416761 -0,0182036 -0,004843 -0,08807   -0,008204   0,1382*  -0,1138 -0,001326 0,1042 




-0,102951 -0,02279 -0,1642   -0,07518   -0,07415   -0,3133*** -0,07717 0,01867 
(-0,6001) (-0,06425) (0,1020) (0,1312) (0,1983) (-3,723) (-1,469) (0,1552) 
SARL 
-0,124829 -0,034586 0,2896** -0,2320   0,04607   0,03046   -0,5537*** -0,04038 0,1055 
(-1,0366) (-1,0007) (2,553) (0,2245) (0,03688) (0,1041) (-2,618) (-1,271) (1,394) 
Ln L 
1,59339*** 0,85558*** 0,7164*** 1,619*** 0,8317*** 0,7759*** 1,906*** 0,8493*** 0,7504*** 
(9,2764) (22,1081) (9,931) (0,1443) (0,03922) (0,06236) (7,124) (24,31) (15,30) 
Ln K 
-0,48174*** 0,09425*** 0,2034*** -0,4924*** 0,1482*** 0,2010*** -0,3346*** 0,1664*** 0,1838*** 
(-2,8566) (5,0318) (4,794) (0,1347) (0,01898) (0,03551) (-3,498) (10,44) (5,557) 
LS 
-0,0954477 -0,0632844 0,1436 -0,1083   0,009516   -0,01933   -0,2434*** -0,08625 0,1204 
(-1,5020) (-0,9192) (0,9946) (0,08429) (0,06904) (0,1125) (-2,906) (-1,379) (1,052) 
KLS 
3,0545e-06 5,77e-06** 5,841e-07 1,426e-06   8,810e-06*** 1,784e-06   -4,787e-06 6,78e-06*** 7,939e-07 
(0,9639) (2,3908) (0,1772) (3,362e-06) (2,440e-06) (2,271e-06) (-1,568) (3,560) (0,3438) 
COKLS 
6,913e-06** 1,613e-06 -2,859e-06** -2,630e-06   5,947e-06   8,803e-07   1,005e-05* -3,637e-07 2,502e-07 
(2,1150) (0,9214) (-2,111) (4,711e-06) (3,831e-06) (6,980e-07) (1,883) (-0,09271) (0,6578) 
PARTL 1,34e-05*** 4,01e-05*** 3,28e-05*** 2,405e-05*** 2,950e-05*** 1,699e-05** 1,83e-05*** 3,22e-05*** 1,634e-05** 
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0,036068***   0,03808***      
(3,8221)   (0,007797)      
Ln L* 
Ln K 
      -0,148***   
      (-5,038)   
│ln K│² 
      0,214***   
      (3,523)   
│ln L│² 
      0,036***   




Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 686 444 119 695 502 136 817 486 133 
R
2
 ajusted 0,795 0,798 0,8491 0,6865 0,7301 0,9193 0,7055 0,7897 0,8706 
Heteroscedasticity corrected 
Student statistic in parentheses 
*/**/*** indicates a significant test at the threshold of 10/5/1 percent(s) 
The variable SA is perfectly correlated with the variable SARL; the variable TRANSMI is perfectly correlated with the variables EXNIHILO, REANIM and TRANSFO 






Appendix 4: Brief synthesis of major results 
 
 
















Decrease of the 
effectiveness of 
managerial input but  
indicator slightly 
satisfactory 
Mode of participation non-








Increase of human 
capital ; 
Increase of worker’s 
effort to receive a higher 
dividend 
Non-significant mode of 
participation in small 
businesses because this group 
is heterogeneous in terms of 
performance, due to 
undercapitalization 
characterizing a good deal of 
small cooperatives 
Less suitable participation 
mode for large companies 
since co-ownership, co-
responsibility and co-benefits 
are diluted in more 






Allocation of funds to 
collective reserves more 
influenced by legal 
obligations and tax 
benefits than by the 
choice of the GA 
members to participate in 
the common effort; 
Competing with 
participation in 
individual ownership and 
profit-sharing 







Increase of workers’ 
effort to receive a higher 
pay 
No notable divergences 
across size categories 
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